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Abstract
The slime mould Physarum polycephalum has been used in developing un-
conventional computing devices for in which the slime mould played a role
of a sensing, actuating, and computing device. These devices treated the
slime mould rather as an active living substrate yet the slime mould is a self-
consistent living creature which evolved for millions of years and occupied
most part of the world, but in any case, that living entity did not own true
cognition, just automated biochemical mechanisms. To “rehabilitate” the
slime mould from the rank of a purely living electronics element to a “crea-
ture of thoughts” we are analyzing the cognitive potential of P. polycephalum.
We base our theory of minimal cognition of the slime mould on a bottom-up
approach, from the biological and biophysical nature of the slime mould and
its regulatory systems using frameworks suh as Lyons biogenic cognition,
Muller, di Primio-Lengelers´ modifiable pathways, Bateson’s “patterns that
connect” framework, Maturanas autopoetic network, or proto-consciousness
and Morgans Canon.
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1. Introduction
Classic approaches to cognition were based on human beings, or some-
times, included some great apes or close mammals, leaving unattended a
long list of living entities [1]. This biased anthropomorphic perspective had
a second problem: it blocked pathways to an evolutionary and naturalistic
study of cognition [2]. It is easy to find several studies on minimal examples
of cognition among prokaryotes [3], being protists a perfect example of it.
Of them, ameboides (Myxomycetes) are the best example of the power of
such cognitive studies studies, because they show us the connection bridge
between unicellular (Physarum) to pluricellular (Dictyostelium) living sys-
tems. Thus, Physarum polycephalum shows to be an extremly intelligent
system which offers unique ways for the understading of the emergence of
complex behaviours and cognitive strategies [4, 5, 6]. The mapping of such
minimal cognitive elements in Slime mould makes also possible the analysis
of two different but fundamental ideas: first, to identify the computational
nature of basic cognitive processes, which in our case offer a good example
of a reliable Kolmogorov-Uspensky biomachine; this biocomputational ap-
proach offers a naturalistic way to explain the intricacies of informational
processing from scratch to the supervenience of proto-consciousness. This
process can be explained without relying on any anthropomorhic bias thanks
to implementation of the Morgan’s Canon.As a consequence, slime mould
offers a unique and special biological framework for the identification of the
basic biocomputations that make possible cognition and pave the way for
the emergence of consciousness (understood as meta-level of informational
processing). In the next section we describe in more detail the value of such
selection for the study of cognition.
2. Minimal Cognition: the Bottom-up Approach to Cognition
After the long and intense analysis of human, primate and mammals cog-
nition, the necessity of explaining their evolutionary and basic functional
properties led to the interest for minimal forms of cognition. This minimal
cognition interest was then focused into plants [7] [8] and the fundamental
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chemical mechanisms that rule their behaviour [9]. Fundamental aspects
of biological systems were detected: they process, store and process infor-
mation, a kind of computation [10] [11]. Other studies have also analyzed
the cognitive skills of bacteria [12], [13], or [14]. Despite some attempts of
defining a minimal structure for the existence of cognition [15], we strongly
disagree with the idea that emotional and conscious spheres are necessarily
and uniquely dependent to neurodynamic processes [16]. The principles that
allow, justify and sustain consciousness must rely at a lower fundamental
level, like quantum mechanics [17], and other mathematical approaches have
provided simple informational mechanisms able to be performed by slime
moulds as the basis of data integration and conscious experience. It is very
important to take into account that this analysis must include conceptual
distinctions between 1st, 2nd and 3rd person descriptions of cognitive pro-
cesses. Following [18], we agree with the idea that robust macroscopic data
which involve physical measurements imply a 3rd person approach to the
explanation of the mechanism (in present perfect tense), while this process is
completely underpinned by a microscopic contexts accessible only by 1st and
2nd person perspectives (in present progressive tense). Here, the superve-
nience and direct correlation between microdynamic mechanisms justify the
functional properties of macrodynamic mechanisms, which are not bilateral.
Thus, measurements allow to explain the naturalization of the study of both
consciousness and self -awareness processes, which we have described at their
initial level. These boundaries make possible the mechanistic transition from
irreplaceable experiences to general behaviour descriptions, situated within
specific spatial and temporal horizons. We’ve tried to exemplify these ana-
lytic levels using a bottom up approach to the emergence of complex social
behaviours (and intelligent or creative activity) based on raw and fundamen-
tal biomechanical processes.
Despite some very interesting attempts at looking for the phylogenetic
emergence of consciousness [19], most of the studies elude the analysis of
fundamental aspects which could explain a naturalistic and scalable expla-
nation of consciousness increase in complexity. Some general analysis about
this new approach has been done by [20] and will be explained with more
detail into next sections. In no way are we embracing panpsychist or panex-
perientalist approaches, as could be misleadingly inferred. At the same time
we wish not to dilute our research into unending philosophical debates. Slime
moulds know and gather knowledge via their specific proto-consciousness.
Taking into account these elements we wish to descend even more into
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the tree of life and select slime mould as a very minimal cognitive system
[21]. Despite of the very simple cognitive architecture, slime mould are able
to perform an incredible list of cognitive tasks as well as to be creative [22],
considering this skill as an emergent property of their genomic structure, as it
works for other living systems [23]. As noted by [24], the slime mould shows
outstanding abilities to adapt its protoplasmic network to varying environ-
mental conditions in which it can solve tasks of computational geometry, im-
age processing, logic and arithmetic if and only if data are represented by bi-
nary configurations of attractants and repellents. We speculate that in slime
mould cognition is embedded with computation in morphological patterns of
protoplasmic networks updated locally similarly to a computational process
travelling in disordered dynamically changing graphs, or storage structures,
of Kolmogorov-Uspensky machines [25, 26, 27, 28].
3. Defining the Nature of Slime Mould
The slime moulds are a polyphyletic group of protistic organisms existing
in three major categories: ‘true’, acellular or plasmodial slime moulds of class
Myxogastria, cellular or pseudoplasmodial slime moulds of class Dictyosteliida
and the unicellular microscopic slime moulds of class Protosteliales [29]. Of
the former two varieties, the first is a multinucleate single cell and the second
is a multicellular complex. Therefore, all slime moulds could be tested to
minimal cognition for proto-consciousness.
The basic regulatory functions (as metabolic ones) can explain the emer-
gence of cognitive mechanisms [30], and therefore both homeostatic and
homeodynamic perspectives can allow the existence of a minimal cognition.
But in no case proto-consciousness can only be considered as the summa-
tory of different minimal cognitions, instead of the result of the emergency
of entrangled multi-taxis or multy-tropisms functioning in coherence or de-
coherence playing.
Acellular slime mould P. polycephalum has a sophisticated life cycle [31],
which includes fruit bodies, spores, single-cell myxamoebae and the plas-
modium, a multinucleated syncytium [32]. The plasmodium is a coenocyte:
nuclear divisions occur without cytokinesis. The plasmodium is a large cell.
It grows up to tens of centimetres when conditions are good. The plasmod-
ium consumes microscopic particles, bacteria and flakes oats. During its
foraging behaviour the plasmodium spans scattered sources of nutrients with
a network of protoplasmic tubes. The plasmodium optimises it protoplas-
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mic network to cover all sources of nutrients, stay away from repellents and
minimise transportation of metabolites inside its body. The plasmodium’s
ability to optimise its shape [33] attracted attention of biologists, then com-
puter scientists [34] and engineers. Thus the field of slime mould computing
was born.
So far, the plasmodium is the only stage of P. polycephalum’s life cycle
useful for computation. Therefore further we will use word ‘Physarum’ when
referring to the plasmodium. Most computing and sensing devices made of
the Physarum explore one or more key features of the Physarum’s physiology
and behaviour:
• the slime mould senses gradients of chemo attractants and repellents [35,
36, 37]; it responds to chemical or physical stimulation by changing pat-
terns of electrical potential oscillations [38, 39] and protoplasmic tubes
contractions [40, 41];
• it optimises its body to maximise its protoplasm streaming [42]; and,
• it is made of hundreds, if not thousands, of biochemical oscillators [43,
44] with varied modes of coupling [45].
Slime mould can be seen, if we think at a very simplified level, as a
reaction-diffusion excitable system encapsulated in an elastic growing mem-
brane [46]. The behaviour of the Physarum is governed by an ensemble of
thousands of biochemical oscillator, who set local clocks and control peri-
staltic activity and growth via propagation of actin polymerisation waves
and calcium waves. A coupling between distant parts of Physarum via waves
of electrical potential is manifested in oscillations of the electrical potential.
4. What Does a Slime Mould Know?
Living systems process information in order to react to the environment
and to be able to survive or to transmit their own informational structure
[47]. We can define this process as “knowledge”, because the living system
does not produce automated responses,like a thermostat can do, but it imply
certain evaluation.
Physarum lives in the world of gradients, concentrations of attractants
and repellents, and consequently its behavioural responses are a direct con-
sequence of their interaction with these gradients. For example: while prop-
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agating on a substrate the slime mould avoids domains with concentrations
of repellents exceed a threshold, see e.g. [48].
5. Modifiable stimulus-response pathways from an autopoietic per-
spective [base of all behaviours]
We must admit that one of the key roles for the development of a living
system is its operational autonomy according to the organism’s own internal
program [49, 50].
This determines the basic actions with which the system reacts to stimuli
from the environment–stimulus acting on the system through certain internal
environment structurally coupled receptors. In fact, Maturana and Varela
[51] determined their autopoietic theory considering that the problem of au-
tonomy had to be reduced to its minimal form, in the characterization of the
basic living unit.
An autonomous system that is self-maintained (as it is autopoietic) gen-
erates both development paths and coherent organization, allowing that we
describe ii as an agent. But the relationship between the agency and cog-
nition, within the framework of autonomy, is still precarious. With an au-
tonomous system is self-maintained, offering a hemodynamic balance is not
sufficient reason for the emergence of a discriminatory semiosis and therefore
a minimum cognitive principle.
In short, the basic self-maintenance networks of metabolism, capable of
certain forms of adaptive responses do not show those skills necessary for the
emergence of minimal cognition [52]. A more complex organization, which
gathers mechanisms that go beyond this basic metabolism, is necessary. That
is, that the mechanisms of internal compensation of interactions with the
immediate environment are responsible for the emergence of a biosemiotics
discrimination of second level — macromolecular — allowing both the recep-
tion distinguished between what is noise which is significant for the system
agential autonomous.
We also take into account the generation of autopoietic subsystems when
to explain the minimum domains of perceptual activity in a structurally
stable autopoietic organization. These establish a new criterion of interde-
pendent autonomy within a hierarchy in the organization of living things.
Own cellular components are established as autopoietic interdependent sub-
systems in a hierarchical level lower than the cell. Subsystems comprising
a minimum subvenient enactivity both morphologically and physiologically,
7
exerting a specific regulatory function. We can say, in the words of Leonardo
Bich and Alvaro Moreno [30, 16] that are specific regulatory subsystems.
It is understood as regulation as the capacity of living beings of inter-
nally compensates disturbances [16]. Exogenous environmental phenomena
to organism or disturbances are managed by the agential systems that con-
fer significant and therefore an intrinsic biosemantics to dynamic patterns
of transduced self-regulation. In the words of Piaget, it is assimilation and
an accommodation [53] to the operational closure of the agent to overcome
the binomial “stimulus – response”. That is, the interaction between an or-
ganism and the environment through the adaptation ontogenetic considered
an assimilation of external influences; it involves an internal self-regulation,
or accommodation, and thus a restructuring of the system. This provides
a dynamic and cyclical view of self-regulation: endogenous action → inter-
action with Umwelt → self-regulatory disturbance compensation → internal
re-balances, etc [54].
To achieve effective regulatory an interdependent control autopoietic sub-
system is necessary. But that is sufficiently independent of the dynamics of
the processes controlled, and can be changed without interrupting these pro-
cesses; but also it is able to be linked to parts of the control mechanism of
the system — a regulated subsystem — in order to be able to modulate its
operations [30]. More specifically, the appearance of a control subsystem im-
plies that the organism itself generates a set of decoupled processes from the
dynamics of their constitutive system. The dynamic decoupling between the
regulator and the regulated constituent subsystems means that both — al-
though they are correlated through the system — are integrated, working at
different intrinsic rhythms. That is, the regulation components are produced
and maintained by the activity of the constituent subsystems regulated, and
said activity, in turn, is modulated by the regulator.
As occur in the TCST system of Escherichia coli bacteria [55] this hap-
pens when the function of the regulation subsystem is neither specified nor
directly determined by the metabolic activity of constituent subsystems reg-
ulated: that is, is “stoichiometrically free” latter [56], so no biochemical
balance between them. More specifically, the fundamental idea of this form
of decoupling is that activation and operation of the subsystem control is
not directly dependent on its concentration (or concentration variation), ie
of its production by the constituent subsystems regulated, even although
these subsystems ensure their presence in the system. In contrast, activation
control subsystem is caused by environmental disturbances, and operations
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depend on their internal organization and structure of its functional compo-
nents. So the regulator subsystem can work operationally differently from
the constituent subsystems regulated, and can, in principle, act as a regulator
controller of regulated constituent subsystems [30].
5.1. Recognition in regulators subsystems
In this organizational architecture, the functional role of a regulator sub-
system is modular basic constituent network, switching between different
metabolic systems available in the system in relation to changes in environ-
mental conditions. It does so in such a way that new metabolic/constituent
regimes engendered by regulatory switches must be able to cope with the new
environmental conditions, expanding the range of disturbances or stimuli to
which the system can respond quickly and efficiently, and enrich the field of
dynamic functional behaviours available.
The crucial thing is that the organism endowed with regulatory systems
reacts in a new way, do things according to what it recognizes and distin-
guishes in its interactions with “Umwelt” of the autopoietic regulator sub-
system. In fact, the “recognition” in fact, is a complex process, since the
specific characteristics of the interactions with the Umwelt are responsible
for triggering the subsystem regulations cannot directly drive the system re-
sponse, as in the case of responses basic network. In fact, a disruption active
certain regulation subsystem, which in turn modulates the basic constituent
network so as to meet the specific environmental characteristic that triggered
the regulatory response.
A couple of examples applicable to myxomycete P. polycephalum would
be:
• that the organism is powered by a new source of food richer in nutrients
that can win more energy, even if you decide to choose the path worst
environmental condition which should go with a poor nutrient food
source [57].
• that transforms their morphology — plasmodium to sclerotium — to
preserve them in a hostile environment lacking food, minimizing your
breathing [58] maximizes its longevity [59, 60, 61].
In other words, the fact of recognition is a consequence of the specific
nature of the disturbance and internal regulatory organization system.
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5.2. Recognition and equivalence classes
In such scenario an environmental disturbance becomes a specific and
recognizable interaction due to the nature of the relationship with the sub-
system controller. Regulator subsystem is responsive to the disturbance, in
the sense that endogenously establishes the equivalence classes in their envi-
ronment with respect to these specific changes, according to how variations
activate the controller subsystem to trigger regulatory action. These equiv-
alence classes not consist externally associations between the disturbances
and the results of the changes brought about in the system as a whole, as in
the previous case. Rather, they are the results of the evaluation (activation
control subsystem further regulatory action on the constituent subsystems
regulated) operated by their regulation subsystem that achieve endogenous
and functional significance for the system.
Therefore, beyond the debate about whether cognition is coextensive with
life, it is clear that regulation becomes a necessary condition for the appear-
ance of cognition, considering as an essential aspect of cognition that the
knower should be capable of transforming an external influence on an adap-
tive integration or, in cognitive terms, in a meaningful interpretation [16].
And this requirement is essential for cognition is carried out only by regula-
tion rather than by self-production basic biological and self-maintenance (i.e.
minimal autopoietic systems), as some of the defenders of the tautology of
life and cognition have argued.
6. Significant Regulation
A system with normativity capacity, in fact, is able to do things ac-
cording to what distinguishes (what the regulation is sensible subsystem).
Consequently, interactions with the environment become more than a source
of confusing noise, but become a world generated endogenously (natural-
ized) of meanings — An Umwelt [62, 63]: interactions functionally become
“significant” for the system itself, without being to an outside observer.
Here the term “meaning” as a synonym for“functional for the system”
(see [15]) is used. More specifically, a source of disturbance makes sense
when you can distinguish by the regulatory subsystem and this distinction
has an operational effect on the system. Through the action of the regulatory
system subsystem modulates its own activity (in the constituent subsystems
regulated) on the basis of this distinction is as contribute to their own self-
maintenance.
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6.1. Electrical activity
Another example of normative regulatory system an be set in the regu-
lation of Ca2+ for activation or inhibition of myosin allowing oscillations of
current flow for displacement plasmodium. Here Ca2+ acts as an inhibitor
of the oscillations of the actin-myosin, but in the opposite direction of the
existing inhibitory activity in the process of contraction of animal muscle
cells. The absence of Ca2+ in neuromuscular processes inhibits contracture
activity while in plasmodia; inhibition increased by Ca2+ [64] arises. Ca2+
but is a powerful oscillator in the presence of cAMP in the environment of
plasmodium [65].
More broadly, the extensive utilization of bioelectric phenomena by Phy-
sarum [66, 67, 68, 39] dovetails with the broader use of ionic signaling in mor-
phological computation throughout metazoan. Indeed, ion channel and neu-
rotransmitter hardware, which underlie the software of cognition in animal
brains, are evolutionarily ancient and pre-date multicellularity [69, 70, 71, 72].
For a review of cognitive approaches to the decision-making and memory in
non-neural metazoan cells and tissues in the context of embryogenesis, regen-
eration, and cancer suppression see [73, 74, 75]. The reading of bioelectric
states of Physarum during learning and problem-solving, to achieve a kind
of “neural” decoding, is an on-going effort at the frontier this field.
6.2. Regulatory subsystems independent of metabolic processes
In the same way that the phenomenon of chemotaxis for the bacteria
E. coli seen, also myxomycetes offer specific chemotaxis, both multicellular
pseudoplasmodium Dictyostelium discoideum [76, 77, 78] and the acellular
plasmodium P. polycephalum [79, 80, 36]
But in the case of taking the phenomenon of chemotaxis as a condition
for cognitive process requires as [16] explains that part of the regulatory sub-
systems are independent of metabolic processes. This case is a complex form
of driven stability taxis, achieved through the coupling of two subsystems
and indirect feedback through the environment. The movement here is au-
tonomous and depends on the internal differentiation of the organization and
activity of inherent self-maintenance of the cell. Additionally, this behaviour
is functional in the sense that contributes to the maintenance of conditions of
existence of metabolism and consequently of the entire system. However, in
this example, although the system is capable of complex viable behaviours,
the system responds as a network together without distinguishing the specific
of their interaction with the environment, evaluating them and modulating
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action accordingly. In this case, the environment is only a noise source that
disturbs the metabolism, and the behavioural response is filtered through the
latter.
This chemotactic mechanism involves at least three molecular complexes:
• a receiver subsystem, which is activated by environmental effectors
(chemoattractants and chemorepellents);
• a conductive tip in the case of pseudopod plasmodia and pseudoplas-
modia, and
• a group of molecules, and macromolecular filaments which act as a
bridge between the two. Usually, the latter are activated molecules
through non-covalent post-transducer modifications, such as phospho-
rylations cascades.
The distinguishing feature of this complex case of chemotactic behaviour
is that the system, thanks to the action of a subsystem control, is able to
modulate their behaviour based on specific interactions with the environ-
ment, which acquires a specific operational meaning for the system, so that
the latter is able to change their behaviour accordingly. This is made pos-
sible by the fact that the regulation subsystem is decoupled from the other.
This means that the regulatory subsystem — in the case of plasmodia P.
polycephalum would be reaction-diffusion pattern ([81] through the filaments
and myosin microtubules. It is the stimulus that comes from attractants or
repellants (external) requiring adapts the material to their spatial behaviour.
The specific mechanism used is the diffusion of attractants or repellants in the
environment. The presence of these stimuli in the periphery of the material
provides the impetus for morphological adaptation [82].
This decoupling actually introduces a new degree of freedom in the sys-
tem, one or more new variables in the controller subsystem which does not
depend directly on the constitutive regime and therefore may be sensitive
to something different than the internal state of the system: in this case a
characteristic of the environment. This characteristic takes an important role
for the entire system, and subsystem of decoupling achieves a functional role
when the effect of its regulatory action occurs, caused by the disturbance and
contributes to system maintenance. From this relatively elementary chemo-
tactic mechanism, then, a variety of more complex tactical behaviours can be
implemented [30, 16]. What is common to them is that cannot be treated in
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terms of input-output, as if the behaviour of the system was expelled by the
disturbance. On the contrary, they can be characterized in terms of endoge-
nous generation of adaptive response by focusing on the internal organisation
of the system and, above all, regulatory subsystems.
So we conclude chemotaxis of myxomycetes — such as bacterial — rep-
resent a clear comparative example of how certain fundamental capabilities
for the origin of cognition may arise in the minimum living systems, and how
this is possible only through the action of regulatory mechanisms. Only in
the presence of regulation that specific disturbances acquire a meaning for
the system. This is a biosemiotic foundation of the basics of cognitive mini-
mum principles, emerging regulatory system factors acquire those minimum
principles offered in cognitive biology [83][84][51][85][86][87].
7. Minimal Cognitive Principles in Myxomycetes. Cognitive biol-
ogy as framework
From the Darwinian theory of species each organism is evolving from
a common root. This is very important as the foundation of a common
root of the minimal cognitive principles that underpin the higher emergent
developments. For this reason, three additional elements are required in
cognitive biology:
• the study of cognition in a species of organism is useful, through con-
trast and comparison, for the study of the cognitive capacities of an-
other species [88];
• to proceed with more complex cognitive systems, it is useful to start
from the simplest organisms [89], and
• For a better understanding of the nature of cognition, the greater the
number and variety of species studied in this sense [90].
While cognitive science strives to explain human thought and the conscious
mind, the work of cognitive biology focuses on the most fundamental process
of cognition of any organism [91].
Cognitive biology is, therefore, a new approach to biological paradigms
about cognition that need a coherent significantly contextualisation, both to
experimental data and to a semantic development of biology.
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Ladislav Kovac of the Department of Biochemistry and Genetics of the
Faculty of Natural Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava states
in [92] that:
“Cognitive biology is more a reinterpretation of existing data than
a research program that offers new experimental approaches to
old problems.”
and adds:
“Cognitive biology aims at a synthesis of data from various sci-
entific disciplines within a single framework of conceiving life as
the epistemic unfolding of the universe (the epistemic principle).
According to evolutionary epistemology, it considers biological
evolution as a progressive process of accumulation of knowledge.
Knowledge manifests itself in the constructions of organisms, and
the structural complexity of the constructions that carry the in-
corporated knowledge corresponds to its epistemological complex-
ity. In contrast to evolutionary epistemology, cognitive biology is
based on the assumption that the molecular level is fundamental
to cognition and adheres to a principle of minimum complexity,
which states that the most efficient way to study any trait of life
is by studying it at the simplest level in which it occurs.”
For this reason the interest in a new reformulation of the concept of
cognitive process and intelligence requires a deeper understanding of the
behaviour of living systems, where cognition does not depend on the existence
of a nervous system that channels it, but on functional circuits which allow
the minimal perception of the surrounding environment and its biosemiotic
processing in vivo [93].
8. Minimal Cognition Principles Illustrated by Tables of Concep-
tual Relationships
8.1. Pamela Lyon’s Table
Pamela Christine Lyon of the University of Adelaide in Australia argues
that cognition is a natural biological phenomenon of maximum access, like
other natural biological phenomena: by studying simple model systems (such
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as bacteria, myxomycete) can be understand the bases and then expand to
more complex examples (from bees and ants to hominids). Lyon develops
a biocognition (as says van Dujin [94]) from a biogenic framework, whose
approach tries to anchor the concept of cognition itself in biology. In this
approach, cognition is primarily a form of biological adaptation that confers
certain selective advantages specific to organisms by allowing them to cope
with environmental complexity.
Pamela Lyon [86] synthesizes in ten biogenic principles the development
that Kovac [92] made based on the principles of cognitive biology. This syn-
thesis illustrates the depth of the bases with which they have been established
in the school of cognitive biology of Adelaide and which are listed as follows:
1. Continuity: Complex cognitive abilities have evolved from the simplest
forms of cognition. There is a continuous line of significant descent.
(Do not rule out the appearance of new capabilities with greater com-
plexity).
2. Control: Cognition directly or indirectly modulates the physical-chemical
processes that constitute an organism.
3. Interaction: Cognition facilitates the establishment of reciprocal rela-
tions of causality with the characteristics of the environment, giving rise
to exchanges of matter and energy that are essential for the continuous
persistence of the organism, well-being or reproduction.
4. Normativity: Cognition refers to the (more or less) continuous assess-
ment of the needs system relative to prevailing circumstances, the po-
tential for interaction, and whether the current interaction is working
or not.
5. Memory: Cognition requires the ability to retain information for a
period of time greater than zero.
6. Selectivity: Because an organism is able to interact profitably with
some, but not all, properties of the environment, cognition involves the
differentiation of some states from the affairs of other states of affairs.
7. Valencia: In relation to the needs of the body and/or experience dif-
ferent environmental properties will be invested with different degrees
of strength or importance, both positive and negative.
8. Anticipation: Cognition is intrinsically future oriented (what happens
next?) And therefore predictive.
9. Reduction of randomness: Cognition is an important mechanism that
biological systems reduce and modulate the influence of random per-
15
turbations on their functioning and, therefore, are resistant to distur-
bances.
10. Interdependence: The biochemical pathways that innervate cognition
are intimately linked to those of other biological functions, making
delimitation difficult and largely a function of explanatory objectives.
(The map is not the territory).
To find the minimum processes of cognition in cognitive biology we must
take into account the production and processing of communication signals for
the behaviour of the group and types of interconnection between individual
single units (cells).
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Minimum Cognitive Principles
Pamela Lyon (2006) P. polycephalum Behaviour
Continuity
Tubulin isotypes relationship between P. polycephalum
and different mammals, including humans [95]
Intracellular communication: reaction-diffusion model
[96]
Decision making and “scatter” or state of indecision
between different attractors for foraging [97]
Control
Unit microtubules for migrating towards the conductive
cores plasmodium area [98]
Decision making and “scattor” or state of indecision
between different attractors for foraging [97]
Anticipation and memory periodic pulses [99]
Distribution of nutrients [4]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
A stimulus triggers the release of a signaling molecule,
generating a feedback loop [101].
Interaction
Chemotaxis [35][102][103]
Microtubule associated with chemotaxis [104][105]
Irrationality making food choices [106]
To leave chemicals in the environment, which are at-
tractive to congeners to find food. Communication-
based to cooperation and sociality [107].
Fusion microplasmodia to form macroplasmodia in a
percolation transition [108].
Normativity
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive networks
[109]
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Comparative evaluation standards for decision making
food [106]
Precise speed decision making [110]
Memory Anticipation and memory periodic pulses [99]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Selectivity
Decision making and “scatter” or state of indecision
between different attractors for foraging [97]
Valencia
Unit microtubules for migrating towards the conductive
cores plasmodium area [98]
Relationship of flow of electric current and polarization
associated with filaments and myosin microtubules, in
turn coordinate current flow (streaming) and plasmod-
ium oscillations for “mobiligence” [111]
Anticipation Anticipation and memory periodic pulses [99]
Reduction randomness
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive networks
[109]
Reaction-diffusion model for streaming oscillation pat-
terns [96]
Composition of a set of networks basic topologies [112]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Detection stimulus intensity differences through the
Weber-Fechner Law [6]
Interdependence Plasmodium to sclerotia [113], [60], [114]
Relationship of flow of electric current and polarization
associated with filaments and myosin microtubules, in
turn coordinate current flow (streaming) and plasmod-
ium oscillations for “mobiligence”[111]
continued on next page
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8.2. Mu¨ller, di Primio and Lengeler’s Table
Bernd S. Mu¨ller and Franco di Primio both of Institute for Autonomous
intelligent Systems of German National Research Center for Information
Technology and Joseph W. Lengeler of Deptartment of Biology/Chemistry,
University of Osnabrck in Germany [85] have assembled the minimal cogni-
tive abilities into the following list:
• Modifiable stimulus-response pathways [base of all behaviours]
• Selective search
• Perception
• Memory
• Expectations formation reaction [on the sudden deprivation of food]
• Detecting the identity
• Scrutiny [Counting in selective search]
• Adaptation
• Habituation
• Learning
• Cooperation [both for the individual living in a population and the
population as a whole]
• Reconfigurability of the body [Synthesizing a situation-dependent or
self-destruct of effectors and sensors; to avoid hunger]
• Flexibility [tensegrity] This minimal cognition is amplified than Mu¨ller
et al contribuition. We aggregate the mechanosensory transduction
by bioarchitecture [115] of filaments like vertebral column and wiring
scaffold biophysics [116] for electrochemical connections.
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Minimum Cognitive Principles
Mu¨ller, di Primio and
Lengeler (2001)
P. polycephalum Behaviour
Modifiable stimulus-response
pathways [base of all
behaviours]
Minimum travel toward food [117]
Retroactivity negative [117]
ATP at the tip of plasmodium supervenes locomotive
capacity [97]
Detection stimulus intensity differences through the
Weber-Fechner Law [6]
Selective search
Rules for Biologically Inspired Design adaptive net-
works [109]
Selective search
Comparative evaluation standards for decision mak-
ing food [106]
Precise speed decision making [118]
Decision making, taking into account the variables of
the key strengths of different foods [119]
Decision-making for solves the two-armed bandit [120]
Perception Barriers of maze [117]
Foraging sources [117]
Memory Anticipation and memory periodic pulses [99]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Expectations formation reac-
tion [on the sudden depriva-
tion of food]
Reaction-diffusion model for streaming oscillation
patterns [96]
continued on next page
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Distribution of nutrients [4]
Detecting the identity
Detection of changes in rates between separate paths
to take parts [100]
Minimum distance [117]
Scrutiny [in selective search]
Composition of a set of networks basic topologies [112]
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive net-
works [109]
Creating minimum transport networks [110]
Decision making and “scatter” or state of indecision
between different attractors for foraging [97]
Adaptation
Morphodynamic changes that depend on the environ-
ment for motility [121]
Adaptation
Rules for Biologically Inspired Design Adaptive Net-
works [109]
The stimulus comes from attractants or repellants (ex-
ternal) provides the impetus for morphological adap-
tation [111]. Maximizing internal flows by adapting
patterns of contraction to size [122].
Habituation [creating habits]
Responsiveness decline and spontaneous recovery
[123]
Habituation to be exposed to an innocuous repellent
and transfer learning to another cell no exposed [124].
Learning
The aversive response still occurred to another stim-
ulus [123]
Associative learning to acquire a reversed thermotac-
tic property, a new preference for the lower tempera-
ture [5].
continued on next page
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Cooperation
Production of fruiting bodies [125][126][127]
Interdependent collective irrationality of cooperative
behaviour and violation of the principle of collective
decision regularly supply [118]
To leave chemicals in the environment, which are at-
tractive to congeners to find food. Communication-
based to cooperation and sociality [107]
Fusion microplasmodia to form macroplasmodia in a
percolation transition [108]
Flexibility [tensegrity]
Unit microtubules for migrating towards the conduc-
tive cores plasmodium area [98]
Ratio of electric current flow and polarization asso-
ciated with the actin-myosin and microtubules that
coordinate the flow (streaming) of the plasmodium
and its oscillations to the “mobiligence” [128]
Body reconfigurability
[Synthesising a
situation-dependent or
self-destruction of effectors
and sensors; to avoid hunger]
Plasmodium to sclerotia [113][60][114]
Reaction-diffusion parameters under sol-gel condi-
tions the plasmalemma [97]
8.3. Gregory Bateson’s Table
Gregory Bateson’s contribution to cognitive biology is that he sat that
matter and energy are impregnated of circular processes of information of
differences, creating ”patterns that connect”. His project was to explain the
mind in terms of complexity and cybernetic organisation in the way that he
was conceived it.
The six criteria that integrate the cognitive processes, or as Bateson calls
it, mental processes are:
1. A mind is a set of interacting parts or components. It is an autopoietic
red concept that is a network of interacting components.
2. The interaction of the parts of the mind is triggered by difference, and
difference is a non-substantial phenomenon that is found neither in space
nor time, the difference is related to neguentropy and entropy rather than to
Energy.
22
3. The mental process requires collateral energy. In this criterion Bateson
highlights the distinction between the ways in which living organisms and
non-living systems interact with their environments. What Bateson exposes
is that to describe the energy of life and to describe that of the forces and
clashes of the non-living there should be a differentiated syntax.
4. The mental process requires circular (or more complex) processes of
determination. Like Uexku¨ll’s Funktionkreises, biofeedback’s Bertalanffy and
Autopoiesis’ Maturana and Varela.
5. In the mental process, the effects of difference must be seen as trans-
formations (i.e. coded versions) of events that have preceded them.
6. The description and classification of these processes of transformation
reveal a hierarchy of logical prototypes immanent in phenomena.
These criteria by Gregory Bateson on cognitive processes have been linked
to the cognitive processes of Humberto Maturana.
Mental/Cognitive processes
Gregory Bateson (1979) P. polycephalum Behaviour
A mind is an aggregate of
interacting parts or
components
Interdependent collective irrationality of cooperative
behaviour for decision making [106]
Precise speeds and decision-making [118]
Distribution of nutrients [4]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Association with actin filaments and microtubules
myosin coordination of current flow (streaming) of the
plasmodium and its oscillations to the “mobiligence”
[128]
The interaction of the parts
of mind is triggered by
difference
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Collective cooperativeness in making food choices [106]
Detection stimulus intensity differences through the
Weber-Fechner Law [6]
continued on next page
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The mental process requires
collateral energy
Distribution of nutrients [4]
Mental process requires circu-
lar (or more complex) deter-
mination processes
Reaction-diffusion model for streaming oscillation pat-
terns [96]
In the mental process, the
effects of the difference
should be seen as
transformations
Internal communication: Reaction-diffusion model [96]
Decision making and “scattor” or state of indecision be-
tween different attractors for foraging [97]
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive networks
[109]
(i.e., coded versions) of events
that have preceded
Comparative assessment standards for making food
choices [106]
Precise speed and decision-making [110]
Decision-making for solves the two-armed bandit [120]
The description and classifica-
tion of these transformation
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive networks
[109]
Processes reveal a logical
hierarchy of immanent
phenomena prototypes
Comparative assessment standards for making food
choices and violation of the “principle of Condorcet”
[106]
Precise speed decision making [110]
8.4. Maturana’s Table
While Bateson worked from the scientific intuition forged from the ob-
servational method, typical of psychoanalysis, Maturana made it from the
cybernetics itself with an innovative language. To paraphrase Paul Dell [129],
Maturana contains the ontology that Bateson did not develop. While Bate-
son exposes his ideas in a sort of “cosmology” of biology for a cybernetic
epistemology, Maturana realizes an ontology of biology in an epistemology
that conjugates with the ideas of Bateson. Maturana sums up his analogy
with Bateson’s ideas in these three points previously implicated with Bate-
son’s:
1. An autopoietic network is a network of interacting components. Here he
conjugates with Bateson insofar as the mind is an aggregate of parts or
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interacting components. In other words, mind/cognition and autopoi-
etic network support two plausible homeomorphic stages (not identical
in themselves, as observed from the incorrect tautology between life
and cognition). While in Bateson the interaction of parts of the mind is
triggered by difference, for Maturana the difference is a non-substantial
phenomenon that is found neither in space nor in time. The difference
is rather related to neguentropy and entropy, rather than to energy
[130] [131].
2. The response of an organism requires structural coupling and non-linear
patterns. Something that fits the idea of Bateson, in which a mental
process requires a collateral energy.
3. The characterization of a living system, in terms of nonlinear patterns,
infers autopoiesis. Nonlinear causality generates dissipative structures.
In this case it follows the point at which Bateson explains that a men-
tal/cognitive process requires circular (or more complex) processes of
determination. Autopoietic systems require nonlinear patterns such
as the reaction-diffusion equations, and serve as a non-linear pattern
for uncoupled oscillations in the Physarumm. Likewise, the concentra-
tion factors of multiple cells of Dictyostelium discoideum, or of Dic-
tyostelium mucoroides — already observed by Uexku¨ll [132] — by the
cAMP generate patterns of dissipative structures, excitation patterns,
of Belousov-Zhabotinsky medium. These, among other factors, such as
the role of Ca2+ in actin-myosin in the streaming of Physarum proto-
plasm are part of what are considered as adaptive regulatory factors,
fundamental for the generation of minimal cognitive processes. Let us
see how this theory is deduced, from the role of biological autonomy.
Mental/Cognitive processes
Humberto Maturana
(1970)
P. polycephalum Behaviour
An autopoietic network is a
network of interacting
components
Interdependent behaviour irrationality of collective de-
cision making [106]
Precise speeds and decision-making [110]
continued on next page
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Distribution of nutrients [4]
Using his trail for spatial memory [100]
Relationship of flow of electric current and polarization
associated with filaments and myosin microtubules, in
turn coordinate current flow (streaming) and plasmod-
ium oscillations for “mobiligence” [111]
The response of an organism
requires structural coupling
and nonlinear patterns
Anticipatory mechanisms underlying behaviour from the
perspective of nonlinear dynamical systems [112]
Decision making and “scatter” or state of indecision be-
tween different attractors for foraging [97]
Arboreal behaviour patterns similar to excitation waves
in Belousov-Zhabotinsky medium [133][134]
Rules for biologically inspired design adaptive networks
[109]
Detection stimulus intensity differences through the
Weber-Fechner Law [6]
The stimulus comes from attractants or repellants (emi-
ulxternal) provides the impetus for morphological adap-
tation [111]
The characterization of a
living system, in terms of
nonlinear patterns
Autopoiesis inferred. The
non-linear causality generates
dissipative structures.
Anticipatory mechanisms underlying behaviour from the
perspective of nonlinear dynamical systems [112]
Reaction-diffusion model for streaming oscillation pat-
terns [96]
Decision making and “scatter” or state of indecision be-
tween different attractors for foraging [97]
Arboreal behaviour patterns similar waves in Belousov-
Zhabotinsky system [133][134]
continued on next page
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9. Emerging Sources of Cellular Levels of Sentience and Conscious-
ness
Consciousness is emerging as a basic and inherent property of biological
organisms which is relevant for their survival and evolution [135] [136] [137]
[138]. Importantly in this respect, plants and several unicellular organisms
generate endogenous anesthetics any time they are wounded or stressed (au-
thor?) [89] [139]. Hypothetical basic unit of consciousness in multicellular
organisms, such as humans, non-human animals and plants [140] [89] [141]
[142] [143] [144] [136] [137] [138], might be represented by cellular and sub-
cellular levels of consciousness [145] [146]. There are at least three possible
sources of sentience and consciousness (understood as a gradual self-mapping
tool) at the cellular and subcellular levels.
It is important to realize that ion channel and neurotransmitter hardware,
which underlie the software of cognition in brains, are evolutionarily ancient
and pre-date multicellularity [69, 72]. For a review of cognitive approaches
to the decision-making and memory in non-neural metazoan cells and tissues
in the context of embryogenesis, regeneration, and cancer suppression see
[73, 74, 75].
The excitable membranes with critical proteins embedded especially in
highly ordered lipid rafts, vibrating and excitable microtubules and actin
filaments, as well as biological quasicrystals based on the five-fold symmetry.
Possible relevances of biological excitable membranes for cellular con-
sciousness is supported by their sensitivites to diverse anaesthetics inducing
loss of consciousness in humans, as well as loss of responsiveness in animals
and plants (author?) [147] [135] [148]. It is important to be aware that
electrically-active membranes evolved early in the biological evolution [149]
(author?) [150] [151] [152] [153] [154] and are present even in prokaryotic
organisms and eukaryotic organelles of endosymbiotic origin [155] [156] [157]
[137]. Our recent report reveal that the sensitivity of plant movements and
behaviour to local and general anesthetics is linked to membranes, action
potentials, and to endocytic vesicle recycling [158]. Another possible source
of sentience at the cellular and subcellular levels is the dynamic cytoskeleton.
Especially microtubules are discussed as important in this respect [159] [142]
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[143] [144], representing quantum channels related to consciousness [160] [161]
and terahertz oscillations in tubulin were reported to be affected by exposures
to anesthetics [162]. Besides microtubules, also the actin filaments behave
as excitable medium which transports ionic waves and mediates eukaryotic
chemotaxis in response to diverse gradients [163] [164] [165] [166]. Actin
cytoskeleton supports lipid rafts, which are ordered domains of biological
membranes particularly sensitive to anesthetics [167] [168] [169] [170].
There are also indications that special proteins or assembly of proteins, es-
pecially those having five-fold symmetry and quasicrystals properties, seem
to be relevant for the cellular and subcellular levels of sentience and con-
sciousness [142] [143].
10. Proto-consciousness and Morgan’s Canon
Up to date, consciousness has been studied in humans and mainly focused
into finding neural correlates of such pervasive phenomena. Because of the
complexity of its study, it has been called “The hard problem” [171]. Despite
of the evident and implicit epistemical challenges, this problem is also related
to the necessity of a theory about the functional meaning of consciousness,
from a cognitive-information perspective. Consciousness, or any related self-
awareness checking, is essential for living systems to enjoy their agency via
Sense of Self. This allows them to act in their own interest: with memories,
predictions, learning, decisions etc. Thus, we must remark that Conscious-
ness, Self-awareness and Sense of Self allow living systems to recognize and
predict patters of external (and internal!) environmental challenges, some-
thing which implies better adaptation, survival and evolution rates. This
self-awareness can be understood as a genome adaptive mechanism [23] nec-
essary for molecular cooperation and, at an evolutionary perspective, basic
for adaptive mutagenesis.
A sense of Self is based on consciousness and anesthetics switch-off both.
Living systems under anesthesia will not survive for very long as they lack
Sense of Self and cognitive agency.
At least in humans, consciousness can be defined as the experiential
awareness of the own existence, but it has demonstrated not to be the hard
control system of the whole sum of cognitive processes, but instead of it,
consciousness must be defined as a super-level mechanism of punctual data
integration for specific decision-taking actions. Therefore we can trace early
mechanisms of data integration for evaluation purposes in slime mould that
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would suggest a proto-consciousness emergence. Proto-Consciousness is es-
sential for living systems again allows organisms to understand complex
context of their environmental situation. They can acts agents successful in
(a) finding food; (b) avoiding predators; (c) finding mating partners, etc. It
is related to the notion expressed by neurologists as “proto-qualia” [172], as
the mechanism to differentiate the sensivity of an specific perception. This
is mechanistically explained by Weber-Fechner law [63]. Using [173, 174], we
can suggest as plausible to consider both the Physarum and CNS mammar-
ial cells (as neurons) has as identic isotype of tubulin for build microtubules
and centrioles (for cellular division or cilliar composition). But while these in
Physarum are alpha-tubulins, in mammarial cells are beta-tubulins. These
changes in “peanut” tubulin structure create in both different electrophysio-
logical properties. It is very interesting to follow these changes in order to find
a link between brainless cells and brain cells behaviours and biomechanical
principles.
Following such a naturalistic approach to consciousness explained by [20],
we will explore the validity and usefulness in this debate of [175], and [176].
This is at the same time a process related to a naturalistic statistical ap-
proach to data processing, also called ’natural statistics’ [177] and that could
provide a Bayesian approach to consciousness [178] which fits perfectly with
Kolmogorov algorithmic information theory [179], which provides a solid way
to deal with the quantity of information in a system, and at the end, and
in some fundamental way, living systems can be considered information pro-
cessing entities for reproduction purposes. It is also interesting to note that
Bayesian models fit well with slime mould information processing [180, 181].
At the same time, we strongly defend that the notion of proto-consciousness
can provide us a naturalistic, evolutionary and bottom up mechanism of ex-
plaining consciousness. As Conwy Lloyd Morgan wrote in his “An Introduc-
tion to Comparative Psychology” in 1903 [182]:
“In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of
higher psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in
terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological
evolution and development.”
For evident reasons, at this low biological level we cannot look for neural
correlates, instead of biochemical correlates of (proto)consciousness.
Our starting point is simple: slime mould computes information. And
there are some basic mechanisms to compute it that allow us to talk about
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proto-consciousness in brainless living systems, easily identifiable in slime
mould. We will see it into the next section.
11. The Computing Slime Mould as Kolmogorov-Uspensky Bioma-
chine
Late 1940s Andrei Kolmogorov published his seminal paper “On the con-
cept of algorithm” [25] where he introduced a concept of an abstract ma-
chine – later called Kolmogovor-Uspensky machine – defined on a dynami-
cally changing graph structure, a computational process on a finite indirected
graph with distinctly labelled nodes. A computational process travels on the
graph, activates nodes and removes and adds edges (author?) [26]. Basic
operations of the machine include: selecting of a node, specifying of node’s
neighbourhood, adding and/or removing nodes and edges. A program for the
machine specifies how to replace the neighbourhood of an active node with a
new neighbourhood, depending on the labels of edges connected to the active
node and the labels of the nodes in proximity to the active node [28]. Gure-
vich [27] suggested that the edge of the ‘Kolmogorov complex’ is not only
informational but also a physical entity and reflects the physical proximity
of the nodes (e.g. even in three-dimensional space the number of neighbors
of each node is polynomially bounded). But most revolutionary feature of
the Kolmogovor-Uspensky machine is its ‘physical nature’; as Andreas Blass
and Yuri Gurevich [28] stated:
“Turing machines formalize computation as it is performed by a
human. Kolmogorov machines formalize computation as it per-
formed by a physical process.”
In [46] we demonstrated in experimental laboratory conditions that Physarum
can be seen as living implementation of the Kolmogorov-Uspensky machine,
where nodes are represented by sources of nutrients and branching points
of the network of protoplasmic tubes, programmed by spatial gradients of
attractants and repellents. Each part of Physarum ‘reads’ and reactors to
quanta of information written in its environment by acting depending on on
the state of its neighbourhood.
Like a Kolmogorov-Uspensky machine embodies data and program in
topology of its graph the slime mould can compute several sets of data with-
out the necessity of a high level integration, or as Andrei Kolmogorov wrote
[183]:
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“... the schema for computing the value of a partially recursive
function may not be directly given in the form of algorithm. If one
develops this computation in the form of an algorithmic process ...
then, through this, one automatically obtains a certain algorithm
...”
The point here is to justify bio-mechanically how different data and differ-
ent kinds of actions are evaluated and coordinated within a slime mould.
This could provide us the key for understanding the existence of a proto-
consciousness. Although we have listed a long list of cognitive patterns,
these processes are not just mechanistic/automated answers to the environ-
ment, but imply a certain evaluation and decision process. This upper level
is not a generally requested task involved into all cognitive processes of slime
mould, but just a small part of them. From an informational perspective, the
process of data binding or integration requires from a mechanism that when
is found in other cognitive systems is often referred as ‘consciousness’. This
can be inferred from collective behaviour of slime mould, clearly intelligent,
and that allows us to explain the hypothetical model that captures the mech-
anistic way of transferring informational states from one functional state to
another one. That is, the path from automation to decision. In the next sec-
tion we will explore the functional properties of this brainless consciousness
mechanism of slime mould.
12. Slime mould complexity and brainless information integration
system
It is beyond any doubt that slime mould do not have brain nor any ner-
vous central system. Despite of this fact, it is also true that regardless of this
fact, they are able to perform incredible cognitive tasks that go beyond au-
tomated chemical responses to the environment. For that reason, we defend
the existence of a proto-consciousness mechanism in slime mould colonies.
Without it we could not explain very complex responses and adaptations to
the organism.
Following the formalization of the Integrated Information Theory of con-
sciousness (henceforth, IIT) [184], information is a
“. . . set of elements can be conscious only if its mechanisms specify
a set of “differences that make a difference” to the set – i.e. a
conceptual structure. A conceptual structure is a constellation of
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points in concept space, where each axis is a possible past/future
state of the set of elements, and each point is a concept specifying
differences that make a difference within the set. The higher the
number of different concepts and their max value, the higher the
conceptual information CI that specifies a particular constellation
and distinguishes it from other possible constellations.”
We have provided in previous sections several examples about how slime
mould execute integration and exclusion informational decisions. Composi-
tion is also an accomplished axiom of IIT because slime mould decide accord-
ing to the environmental changes that modify substantially their behaviour.
Slime mould is an ideal minimal organism to test for consciouness in par-
ticular using ideas from IIT given its many computational and informational
properties and because IIT allows a continuous spectra of degrees rather than
a binary answer to the question of consciousness.
In [185] and [186] it is shown how IIT is deeply and, in a formal setting,
fundamentally connected to the concept of algorithmic complexity and data
compression and in [187] how algorithmic probability—inversely related to
algorithmic complexity by a formal theorem—may explain aspects of bio-
logical evolution. More recently, it has been shown that such foundations
have the ability to explain a wide range of evolutionary phenomenology that
would remain unexplained when making traditional assumptions related to
the role of random mutation in natural selection and how organisms rather
harness the highly structured nature of ecosystems [188].
In [189] it is also shown how experimental behavioural observations can
be explained by algorithmic complexity (as opposed to statistical tools) and
help explain behavioural phenomenology in areas such as working memory
[190, 191], psycometrics [192, 193], visual probabilistic reasoning [194] and
cognitive structures of cultural nature[194] able to quantify a multiple range
of cognitive processes that were more difficult, if not impossible (both for
practical and fundamental reasons), to characterize using conventional (non-
algorithmic) statistical tools. In [195] it is shown how organisms can har-
ness the algorithmic structure of the natural environment mirroring the non-
random structure of the physical world and using the same tools it was shown
how algorithmic complexity can be used to validate behavioural results of an-
imals [189], including foraging communication by ants, flight patterns of fruit
flies, and tactical deception and competition strategies in rodents.
In fact, the only application of IIT to this date [196] completely relied
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on the concept of algorithmic complexity as a foundation of their proposed
numerical measure using lossless compression applied on spatiotemporal pat-
terns of electrocortical responses of humans using Lempel-Ziv where it was
found to reliably discriminate levels of consciousness during wakefulness,
sleep, anaesthesia and minimally conscious states even though such approach
is closer to a measure of entropy and entropy has been shown to be extremely
limited as a computable measure [197, 185]. The nontrivial behaviour of slime
mould and its intricated relationship of awareness and interaction with the
environment suggests that one can device behavioural time series of slime
mould behaviour and apply all these powerful tools and methods of algorith-
mic cognition [198] to determine the complexity of its behavioural capabilities
and shed light on measures of integrated information suggesting some degree
of consciousness in an experimental/numerical setup as an obvious experi-
ment.
13. Concluding remarks
So we conclude chemotaxis of myxomycetes represents a clear compara-
tive example of how certain fundamental capabilities for the origin of cog-
nition may arise in the minimum living systems, and how this is possible
only through the action of regulatory mechanisms. It is only in the presence
of regulation that specific disturbances acquire a meaning for the system.
This becomes, thus, a biosemiotic foundation of the basics of cognitive min-
imum principles by which emerging regulatory system factors acquire those
minimum principles offered in cognitive biology [83, 51, 84, 86, 87, 85].
Also we have seen that experiments with anesthesia in plants are an out-
standing framework to establish conditions of possibility to bridge sentience
with a proto-consciousness [158]. Is necessary to review this experimental
task with slime molds -as Seifriz made on for streaming behaviour studies
[199]- and so to realize that ion channel and neurotransmitter hardware,
which underlie the software of cognition in brains, are evolutionarily ancient
and pre-date multicellularity.
According to the provided data and analysis, slime mould provides an
insightful example of a biosemiotic entity able to perform cognitive tasks and
to explain the first steps from mechanistic automation to decision, as well as
of coordination and cooperation, and also an ideal testbed for consciousness
as a minimal conscious biological organism.
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Physarum exemplifies embedding cognition and computation: the slime
mould perceives its world in parallel, process the information perceived con-
currently, makes decisions in a decentralised manner and represents the de-
cision, or results of the computation, in spatially distributed configuration of
its protoplasmic tubes; the tubes configuration per se might act a program,
similarly to Kolmogorov-Uspensky machine, which determines how the in-
formation perceived will be processed.
Finally, we have introduced Morgan’s canon as a necessary epistemologi-
cal condition to eradicate the anthropomorphization of the sense of cognition,
as well as this bridge to consciousness.
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